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714 BowEN v. CouNTY oF Los ANGELES [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22012. In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.] 
MARJORIE A. BOWEN, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-Oath required of all public 
employees by the Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) 
does not constitute a religious or political test. 
[2] Id.-Oath-Rules Governing.-The loyalty of county employees 
is not exclusively a local affair but is a matter of general state-
wide concern, and the Levering Act (Gov. Code,§§ 3100-3109), 
which fully occupies the field of legislation on the subject of 
loyalty oaths for all public employees, is applicable to county 
employees and precludes the imposition of supplementary local 
requirements. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county to reinstate 
a civil service employee and pay compensation withheld fol-
lowing suspension for refusal to sign oath required by Gov. 
Code, §§ 3100-3109. Writ granted in part. 
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Rich-
ard W. Petherbridge and Nanette Dembitz for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly, As-
sistant County Counsel and Robert L. Trapp, Deputy County 
Counsel, for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Petitioner, a Los Angeles County civil 
service employee, was discharged because she refused to sign 
the oath required of all public employees by the Levering Act 
(Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109), and she has brought this original 
proceeding in mandamus seeking reinstatement and payment 
of compensation which was withheld following her suspension. 
Before the Levering Act went into effect, petitioner exe-
cuted an oath almost identical with that prescribed in section 
3 of article XX of the state Constitution, and she also took the 
oath and made the affidavits required by the board of super-
visors of Los Angeles County.* Thereafter she was directed 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, §52; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 7. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2) Public Employees. 
*See Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 698 [249 P.2d 
287]. 
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by her superior to take the oath prescribed by the Levering 
Act, and upon her refusal to do so she was suspended without 
pay as of October 30 and was discharged on November 29, 1950. 
Nearly all of the questions raised by petitioner with respect 
to the constitutionality and application of the Levering Act 
have been answered adversely to her in Packman v Leonard, 
ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267]. She makes two additional 
contentions, however, with respect to asserted conflicts between 
the act and the provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter. 
[1] 'l'he :first of these, namely that the oath requirement vio-
lates section 41 of the charter,* falls by reason of our holding 
in the Pockman case, ante, at p. 686, that the Levering 
oath does not constitute a religious or political test. 
[2] Secondly, petitioner contends that the Levering Act 
is inapplicable to her because, she asserts, the power to regulate 
the qualifications of county employees is governed exclusively 
by the provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter adopted 
pursuant to section 7¥2 of article XI of the state Constitution 
which authorizes county charters to provide for the regula-
tion by boards of supervisors of the appointment, duties, quali-
fications and compensation of county employees. Under the 
charter the board of supervisors is empowered to provide for 
the appointment and compensation of county employees, a civil 
service system is set up, and the power to prescribe rules 
for the classified service is vested in a county commission. 
(L.A. County Charter, §§ 11, 34.) There is nothing in section 
7lh, however, which can be construed as in any way limiting 
the authority of the Legislature to make regulations under 
its police power concerning the loyalty of persons in the serv-
ice of the state and its political subdivisions. We held 
in Packman v. Leonard, ante, pp. 676, 686 [249 P.2d 267], 
that the Levering Act was adopted by the Legislature in 
the exercise of its police power, and there can be no doubt 
that the loyalty of ·county employees is not exclusively a 
local affair but is a matter of general statewide concern. 
It follows that the Levering Act is applicable to em-
ployees of Los Angeles County, and it is evident from the 
language and purpose of the act that it fully occupies the 
:field of legislation on the subject of loyalty oaths for public 
employees. ( Cf. Fraser v. Regents of University of Califor-
*Section 41 provides: "No person in the [county] classified service, 
or seeking admission thereto, shall be appointed, reduced or removed or 
in any way favored or discriminated against because of his political or 
religions opinions or affiliations,'' 
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nia, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283]; Tolman v. Underhill, 
ante, p. 708 [249 P.2d 280] .) The act establishes a gen-
eral and detailed plan with uniform standards for all public 
employees, and, as we have held in the Tolman ca~e, ante, at 
p. 713, with respect to earlier statutes the act precludes the 
imposition of supplementary local requirements. The oath 
prescribed by the Levering Act is, therefore, the only oath or 
declaration relating to loyalty which may now be required 
of Los Angeles County employees as a condition of their 
employment. (Of. Fraser v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, post, pp. 717, 718 [249 P.2d 283].) 
Since petitioner refused to execute the Levering oath, 
she is not entitled to reinstatement. She is, however, entitled 
to compensation for services rendered up to and including 
30 days following October 3, 1950, the effective date of the 
Levering Act. (Packman v. Leonard, ante, pp. 676, 688 
[249 P.2d 267] .) 
Petitioner's application for a writ directing her reinstate-
ment as a civil service employee is denied. Let a writ of 
mandate issue for the limited purpose of directing payment of 
petitioner's salary up to and including 30 days after October 
3, 1950. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pock-
man v. Leonard, this day filed, ante, p. 688 [249 P.2d 267], 
I would issue a writ of mandate as prayed for in the petition. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 14, 1952. Carter, ,T., was, of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
